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The health of democracy in Albania is precarious. 
The country's electoral contests have so far failed on
each occasion since 1991 to meet high international
standards. A fierce rivalry between the two largest
Albanian parties and their leaders – the Democratic 
Party (DP) of Sali Berisha and the Socialist Party (SP)
headed by Edi Rama – has been wearing down 
hard-won democratic gains made by the country in 
the past two decades since the fall of communism, 
and has pushed Albania off the EU track and into an
ever-more damaging spiral. 
Recent bi-partisan efforts at reconciliation, 
culminating in the adoption of a national Action 
Plan by the government – with the active involvement 
of the parliament – on 21 March, are a welcome and 
promising development. With the next elections 
already distractingly looming, there is a narrow window
of opportunity to tap into this progress and make it 
last for the benefit of Albania's future, as well as for 
the prospects of stability and democracy in Europe. 
How can the EU help Albania to help itself at this 
critical juncture? 
The current political crisis in Albania dates back to 
the June 2009 general elections, when the Socialist
opposition contested the Democrats' victory and
embarked on a boycott of parliament that was to last
almost two years. The embittered political climate
subsequently degenerated into fatal violence at an 
anti-government rally in January 2011, while the 
Tirana mayoral elections in May 2011 were also 
marred by controversy and protests. 
In November 2011, under strong international 
pressure, Albania's two major political parties finally
agreed to resume political dialogue within the
parliamentary structures. However, by then, the
prolonged standoff had already triggered negative
repercussions. Given that a majority vote is required 
to pass many legislative acts, the much-needed reform
process in the country came to a virtual standstill during
the political deadlock – much to the dismay of the
European Union watching nervously from the sidelines. 
With little progress to show under its belt at the time 
of the Commission's 2010 or 2011 annual reviews 
of EU hopefuls, Albania was not recommended for
'candidate status'. Instead, in November 2010, the
Brussels' executive presented Albania with a 'to-do' 
list of 12 key priorities, including the need to ensure 
the proper functioning of parliament, appoint an
ombudsman, reform electoral law and the public
administration, strengthen the fight against organised
crime and corruption, and reinforce the protection 
of human and minority rights. Implementing these
provisions became a sine qua non condition for any
potential advance by Albania towards EU membership.
Opportunity knocks:
can the EU help Albania to help itself?
The King Baudouin Foundation and Compagnia di San Paolo are strategic partners of the European Policy Centre
BACKGROUND
Corina Stratulat and Gjergji Vurmo
POLICY BRIEF
22 March 2012
Despite these strict terms, Albania has moved along 
the list of priorities at a snail's pace. To date, the 
country has partially ticked off one of the 12 boxes: 
it appointed an ombudsman last December. The 
second part of this priority, which requires orderly
hearings and votes in parliament for appointments 
to the constitutional and high courts, remains to be
achieved – along with the other 11 items on the
Commission's roadmap.
To start making headway, the Action Plan adopted by 
the inter-ministerial Committee on European Integration 
STATE OF PLAY
in the Albanian government on 21 March specifies 
the measures, timeframes, resources and responsible
national institutions that will be used to address the
Commission's priorities. This could finally see Albania 
get serious about its reform agenda. However, since
Albania will soon hold presidential (in June 2012) 
and parliamentary (in June 2013) elections, most 
energy is in fact being spent on addressing demands 
for electoral reform rather than on any of the other 
12 points which, in comparison, may offer only 
medium to long-term returns.
Other policy debates related to the rule of law, the
judiciary or corruption issues are thus currently on 
hold until/if the Albanian parties manage to iron out 
their conflicting interests on the election priority: 
the two biggest parties are negotiating directly on 
a formula that maintains the self-serving status quo, 
while smaller parties are channelling through their
respective coalitions demands for changes to electoral
law that could boost their political influence. This 
may well be a common fact of political life in 
established democracies. But as a new and frail
democratic system, Albania cannot afford to tackle
priorities in inverse order, leaving restructuring and
consolidation till the end.
The few months before the publication of the
Commission's next Progress Report in autumn 
2012 represent a particularly opportune moment 
for Albania to reform and move closer to the EU. 
Failure to harness constructively this opportunity 
in order to deliver on the bulk of the 12-priority list 
could see Albania enter the campaign for the 2013
general elections and grow progressively indisposed 
to tackle reforms during the competition for power.
Similarly, any deferral of reforms will probably 
continue at least until the new government has 
settled into office in the second part of 2013, at 
which point the amount of 'catching up' for 
Albania to do is likely be considerably greater 
and the country's EU membership perspective even 
more distant.
By continuing to drag its feet on substantial reform,
Albania is effectively drifting away from the EU 
and ever closer to the 'stagnation zone' of the 
European integration process, that already harbours
countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia).
Stagnation is bad news for Albania, not least because 
it can degenerate into a full-blown regression. It is 
equally bad news for the EU, which needs to maintain
the reform momentum in the Balkans and the credibility
of the region's membership perspectives after Croatia's
entry in 2013.
At present, of the six Balkan countries still aspiring 
to join the EU (that is, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia), 
only Serbia has moved ahead by receiving candidate 
status at the recent European Council in March.
Montenegro is expected to advance in June, when 
EU governments may decide on a date to open 
accession negotiations. Getting Albania firmly back 
on course towards the EU could thus start to balance 
the bloc's transformative record in the Balkans. The
chances of the EU successfully helping Albania to
overcome its crippling political gridlock are arguably
higher than in the cases of FYR Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina or Kosovo, where internal and external
complexities are far greater. 
PROSPECTS
Albania is the master of its own fate
The European Commission has been pushing Albania 
to reform but for the country to turn a new page, the
seriousness of the current situation must first hit home
among Albanian society and the political elite. The 
way forward requires those in power to take ownership 
of the reform agenda and to act responsibly, drafting 
and implementing policies that coincide with the needs
of the electorate. Likewise, it requires Albanian civil
society to hold their leaders accountable for specific
policy outcomes and to demand that they respect
formally-enacted democratic rights and standards.
In concrete terms, the challenge is twofold. First, 
the fierce power struggle between the two largest 
parties and their leaders, which has become a 
permanent fixture of political, social and economic 
life in Albania since the fall of communism in the 
early 1990s, represents a major stumbling block. This
never-ending cycle of demonisation between political
adversaries and also of independent institutions (such 
as the Prosecutor on the Supreme Court) has kept the
focus away from badly-needed reforms, discredited
democratic processes and institutions in the eyes of 
the Albanian public, and perpetuated a negative image 
of the country abroad.
While recent dialogue across party lines offers a 
glimmer of hope, it must now bear the right results. 
In the past, cooperation has primarily occurred 
whenever it served the best interests of both sides. 
For instance, the swift consensus on constitutional
amendments reached in 2008 between the DP and 
SP essentially gave the two biggest parties the upper 
hand over their smaller political allies and over the
choice of president.
Trade-offs are inevitable in political decision-making,
especially on electoral reform, but these specific 
changes were not the result of broad-based democratic
consultations with other domestic political parties 
or relevant stakeholders in society. In addition, the
ensuing modification of the threshold to elect the
president – from a qualified to a simple majority in 
the last two rounds of the parliamentary vote – gave 
rise to serious concerns about its potential impact on 
the independence of the judiciary in Albania, because 
the president can nominate judges, prosecutors and 
other key members of state institutions, such as the 
State Intelligence Chief.
To be constructive, the current DP-SP dialogue must
become an all-encompassing conversation with all
relevant Albanian political and societal forces. The
outcome should reflect national interest and not the 
will of (some of) the negotiating parties.
'Home-made' solutions agreed in a pluralistic 
governance format are likely to be more sensitive 
to the Albanian context and more acceptable to the
general public. In contrast, failure to internalise and 
apply the democratic principles of inclusiveness and
compromise, or to consider Albania's long-term 
interests, might one day turn Berisha and Rama into
captains of a sinking boat.
Second, bottom-up channels of social accountability 
and civic involvement in policymaking, which remain
severely underdeveloped in Albania, are another 
huge obstacle. A robust civil society, able to act as 
a watchdog and to contribute to formulating and
implementing decisions, can have a multiplier effect 
on the political system.
In Albania, although the civil society sector is fairly 
well-developed – numbering roughly 1,600 non-profit
organisations – there are still no formal mechanisms 
in place for consultations between civil society
organisations (CSOs) and the state, detailed rules
facilitating CSO participation at local level are 
lacking or poorly implemented, there is little public
awareness of civic rights such as access to information,
and financial support provided to CSOs remains
problematic.
Funding from the private and state budget continues 
to be scarce in Albania (amounting to sums that 
normally represent single-digit percentages of total
resources), meaning that CSOs in the country are 
largely dependent on assistance from foreign donors.
Chief among these is the European Union (with €4.5
million during 2010-2011), but the administrative
requirements of EU programmes are usually too
bureaucratic and difficult to access for all but a 
handful of organisations. Moreover, the structure of
external funding is such that most CSOs are driven 
by competition (not cooperation) to win projects for
which money is available, rather than building up 
their expertise and identity in the long run.
Civil society's sustainability and influence over 
political processes in Albania therefore remains 
feeble. To find their voice and make it count in the
policies and actions pursued by leaders, Albanian 
CSOs should try to build networks and cooperate
thematically with other CSOs at national and regional
level by pooling resources and sharing best practices.
They should also seek allies for their monitoring 
and advocacy functions among media actors and
parliamentarians within the country and across 
the Balkans.
However, such efforts will no doubt ultimately 
depend on the political will of Albanian political 
parties to develop an environment in which CSOs 
can operate (from a legal and financial point of view) 
and to accommodate them in practice. Consequently,
successfully addressing the electoral reform priority 
will not be enough if the DP and SP are to genuinely
create effective democracy.
The only real fix is for Albanian politicians to enforce 
the rule of law and resolve any pending issues that
prevent the civil society sector from contributing to
policymaking, including via more transparent and
generous support from the state budget and greater 
fiscal incentives for corporate and individual donations 
to CSOs.
The EU can help but is no substitute for 
domestic action
The European Union can be a pathfinder for Albania's
decision-makers but cannot take charge of the nation's
'rescue' mission. Ongoing concerns related, on the 
one hand, to the post-Lisbon development of the EU 
in an increasingly difficult economic context and, 
on the other hand, to the specific challenges faced 
by Albania, can occasionally hinder robust EU
engagement with the country. But making sure that
Albania consolidates its democracy is also in the 
EU's strategic interests, helping to stabilise and
irreversibly anchor the Balkans to Europe.
The volatile state of affairs in Albania raises the 
question of whether the EU should not have been 
more proactive by intervening more promptly at 
decisive moments, for instance, when the outcome 
of the 2009 vote was first disputed (including by 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights - OSCE/ODIHR), triggering the 
two-year parliamentary boycott. The cacophony 
of opinions among member states and of ideological
positions in the European Parliament, as well as the
Commission's desire to remain impartial when preparing
its avis on Albania's membership application, could 
help to explain why the EU has restricted itself to 
tacit diplomatic mediation efforts during the country's
political impasse.
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For example, senior MEPs, such as Martin Schulz 
and Joseph Daul, convened in May 2010 a meeting 
in Luxembourg with Prime Minister Sali Berisha and
opposition leader Edi Rama to negotiate a solution 
to the political standoff. Similar attempts were also 
made by the EP's Delegation for South East Europe 
and the EU-Albania Parliamentary Committee. 
However, by the end of 2010 it had become clear 
that a strategy of 'reconciliation by stealth' would 
not reverse or prevent the gradual escalation of
Albania's political crisis.
Thus in early 2011, the EU started to be more assertive
and vocal about domestic political developments in
Albania. In response to violent demonstrations in 
Tirana, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
and Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle issued 
on 21 January 2011 a joint public statement urging
Albanian politicians "to engage in a constructive
dialogue to resolve without any further delays the 
long-standing political stalemate".
The following month, on 15 February 2011 in an
address to the EP in Strasbourg, Commissioner Füle
openly declared that "the two Albanian leaders are 
stuck in their own internal impasse", and called on 
them during a speech to the EU-Albania Stabilisation
and Association Council on 19 July 2011 "to put the
country's interest ahead of party agendas".
Another joint Ashton-Füle statement on 19 July 2011
raised expectations that all sides in Albania would 
make a serious effort to overcome the enduring
difficulties regarding the conduct of elections and 
to urgently address the 12 key priorities in an effective
and inclusive manner. 
All this open and constant pressure began to pay 
off, not least by finally persuading the DP and SP to 
return to the negotiating table in November 2011. 
This strategy must continue, and the EU should 
now cast its net wider, taking full advantage of the 
fact that its leverage is strongest at the pre-accession 
stage of the integration process. It should do so by
reacting more quickly and visibly to both negative 
and positive events in Albania, thereby reinforcing
domestic reformers' efforts. 
Equally importantly, it should focus greater attention 
on promoting and judging progress in Albania by
yardsticks related to substantive criteria of democracy,
such as the actual rule of law enforcement and civil
society's input into the policy process. 
The 12-point list is the first step in the right direction 
but there is room to be more specific via more detailed
requirements/benchmarks and to make an early start 
on issues that need time to address properly (for
instance, developing a well-functioning judiciary).
The EU should also embark on a medium-term 
strategy that helps to strengthen Albanian civil 
society in the pre-accession phase of integration. 
This could include, for example, more pressure on
Albania to adopt and implement a legal framework 
that specifies the role of civil society in policymaking
and implementation; to guarantee that CSOs' input 
is adequately reflected in the policies adopted; to
strengthen the parliament's oversight of the executive
and scrutiny of legislation; and to foster regional
cooperation in order to facilitate the fight against
organised crime, as well as training and best-practice
exchanges among parliamentarians, and members 
of the media and CSOs. 
While broader and deeper conditions are normally
reserved for countries that are more advanced on 
their path towards EU membership, a fine-tuning 
of the EU's approach to Albania could prove a 
win-win strategy. It could help to dissolve for good 
the spectre of political deadlock in Albania, quicken 
the pace of the integration process and consolidate 
the country's democracy.
In parallel, it could demonstrate that the EU is
committed to helping Albania join the 'club' at 
a time when the enlargement process is struggling 
to appear credible and effective, and that the EU 
is capable of developing pre-emptive policies – as
opposed to just reactive and belated responses. But 
for all that to happen, the moment to act is now.
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